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We propose a high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocol that employs temporal correla-
tions of entangled photons. The security of the protocol relies on measurements by Alice and Bob in
one of two conjugate bases, implemented using dispersive optics. We show that this dispersion-based
approach is secure against collective attacks. The protocol is additionally compatible with standard
fiber telecommunications channels and wavelength division multiplexers. We describe several phys-
ical implementations to enhance the transmission rate and describe a heralded qudit source that is
easy to implement and enables secret-key generation at > 4 bits per character of distilled key across
over 200 km of fiber.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] en-
ables two parties, Alice and Bob, to establish
a private, shared cryptographic key. However,
hardware constraints such as the optical state
generation and photon-counting rates limit the
rate of generating the key. By measuring pho-
tons in a high-dimensional Hilbert space, Al-
ice and Bob may increase the shared informa-
tion generated for each detected photon (or
photon pair, in the case of entangled-photon
QKD), thereby enabling greater key genera-
tion rates compared to measurements in low-
dimensional Hilbert spaces. Furthermore, us-
ing high-dimensional correlations may provide
greater robustness to noise [3]. Numerous de-
grees of freedom of photons have been investi-
gated, including position-momentum [4], time
[5–8], energy-time [9, 10], and orbital angular
momentum (OAM) [11, 12], but to our knowl-
edge, no security proofs for these protocols have
been published against collective or coherent at-
tacks.
Here, we introduce a high-dimensional QKD
protocol that employs timing information of
photons — analogous to pulse position mod-
ulation (PPM) — to maximize the secret-key
capacity under technical constraints. We focus
the discussion on a scheme employing entan-
gled photon pairs generated by Alice at ran-
dom times by spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC) and sent to Bob over a quan-
tum channel, and we discuss variations of the
scheme that employ single-photon sources or
weak classical light. For the entangled-photon
protocol, we show security against collective at-
tacks through measurements by Alice and Bob
in two conjugate bases, which are implemented
using single-photon detectors and simple disper-
sive optical elements. This protocol, which we
term dispersive optics QKD (DO-QKD), ben-
efits from the robustness of temporal correla-
tions in single-mode fiber and free space. We
estimate that practical implementations could
reach a secret-key capacity of > 4 bits per char-
acter of distilled key (bpc) with transmission
across over 200 km in fiber.
II. THE PROTOCOL
The principal steps for the protocol are state
preparation and transmission, state detection,
and classical information post-processing. We
present a schematic for these steps in Fig. 1(a).
1.) State preparation and transmission: Al-
ice generates a biphoton state via sponta-
neous parametric down-conversion (SPDC). For
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2a weak, continuous-wave pump at frequency
ωp and operation at frequency degeneracy, the
down-converted state (cf. Ref. [7]) can be ap-
proximated by
|ΨAB〉=
∫∫
ψ(tA, tB)e
i
ωp
2 (tA+tB) |tAtB〉 dtAdtB ,
(1)
where
ψ(tA, tB)∝e−(tA−tB)2/4σ2core−(tA+tB)2/16σ2coh ,
|tA, tB〉 = aˆ†A(tA)aˆ†B(tB) |0〉, and aˆ†A,B(tj) de-
note the creation operators at time tj for Al-
ice and Bob, respectively. The superposition
of temporal states in Eq. 1 occurs over the
coherence time of the pump field, σcoh. The
correlation time between photons, σcor, is de-
termined by the phase matching bandwidth of
the SPDC source. σcoh can be longer than a
µs for a diode laser, and σcor is on the order of
hundreds of fs to several ps for typical SPDC
sources [13]. The resulting number of infor-
mation eigenstates or alphabet ‘characters’ [14]
given by the Schmidt number, approximately
d ≡ σcoh/σcor, can therefore be quite large [5].
In this investigation, we assume that Al-
ice transmits the state to Bob over a stan-
dard telecom-band optical fiber, and ωp/2 =
2pic/(1560 nm).
2.) State detection: Similar to the parties in
the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob choose ran-
domly to measure their photons’ arrival times
in one of two bases: the basis of direct arrival-
time measurements or a conjugate basis. These
conjugate basis measurements can be achieved
using a transformation Uˆ that transforms an
eigenstate of the ‘direct measurement basis’ into
a superposition of all such eigenstates. We find
that such a transformation can be implemented
easily using group velocity dispersion (GVD),
or ‘second-order dispersion.’ An element with
GVD imparts on each frequency state a phase
φ ∝ β2ω2. β2 = ∂2/∂ω2|ω0(neffω/c), where neff
is the effective index of the mode, ω is the detun-
ing from the mode’s center frequency ω0, and c
is the speed of light in vacuum [15]. Physically,
β2 is proportional to the linear change in the
group velocity as a function of frequency. The
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FIG. 1: (a) Alice and Bob measure in either the
time or dispersed-time basis. In case (1), Alice mea-
sures in the dispersed-time basis and projects Bob’s
photon onto a dispersed state. In case (2), she
projects Bob’s photon onto an undispersed state.
Only measurements in the same basis are corre-
lated. QC represents quantum communication and
CC represents classical communication. (b) An
equivalent prepare-and-measure scheme in which
Alice uses the arrival time of one photon as a sync
time sent to Bob. She selects with a switch (S)
whether or not to apply dispersion on her other
photon and modulates the center time of the dis-
tribution that she sends to Bob using a Gaussian-
distributed random number generator.
SOD operator, Uˆ , is unitary and its frequency
domain representation is diagonal.
Classically, a transform-limited pulse spreads
out in time in a dispersive medium because its
frequency components move out of phase. How-
ever, Ref. [16] showed that if the entangled
photons pass through dispersive media, in the
limit of large coherence time σcoh, the correla-
tion time σcor becomes
σ′2cor ≈
1
σ2cor
[
σ4cor + (β2ALA + β2BLB)
2
]
, (2)
where β2A (β2B) is the GVD introduced by
Alice (Bob) over length LA (LB). Now, sup-
pose that LA = LB = L and βtot = β2A +
β2B . As βtot increases, the temporal corre-
lation between Alice’s and Bob’s photons de-
creases. However, σ′cor = σcor if β2A =
−β2B = β2, which requires that, to within a
global phase, UˆA =
∫
e−i
1
2β2Lω
2 |ω〉A 〈ω| dω and
Uˆ†B =
∫
e−i
1
2β2Lω
2 |ω〉B 〈ω| dω, where ω is the
3frequency detuning from the center frequency
of the biphoton pulse, and |ω〉X denotes a sin-
gle photon at frequency ωp/2 + ω in the setup
of party X. If Alice applies normal dispersion,
UˆA, on her photon, Bob can apply anomalous
dispersion of equal magnitude on his photon to
recover the temporal correlation between their
photons. Thus, Alice’s and Bob’s measurements
in the dispersed basis are also correlated, as
required. In order for the measurement bases
to be conjugate, β2L  σcohσcor. To generate
this normal and anomalous dispersion, a variety
of technologies can be used, including commer-
cial fiber Bragg gratings, silicon photonic crys-
tal waveguides [17], or optical cavities [18].
3.) Classical information post-processing :
Alice and Bob build their distilled key from cor-
related timing events acquired in the same ba-
sis [7]. They therefore communicate their basis
measurements and keep only the results where
they registered clicks in the same basis. They
additionally only consider frames during which
both obtained one detection event. Using the
security procedure detailed below, they deter-
mine their information advantage over Eve. If
this is greater than zero, they then apply er-
ror correction and privacy amplification [19] on
their data set to establish some amount of secret
key.
III. SECURITY
To verify the security of the DO-QKD proto-
col against collective attacks, we calculate the
secret-key capacity [20, 21] in terms of bpc, as
∆I = βI(A;B)− χ(A;E), (3)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(A;B)
is the mutual information between Alice and
Bob, and χ(A;E) is Eve’s Holevo information
about Alice’s transmission [22]. Since the low-
flux limit of the SPDC output (given in Eq. 1) is
Gaussian and Gaussian attacks are optimal col-
lective attacks for a measured covariance matrix
[21, 23], we can calculate the secret-key capacity
using a covariance matrix approach to establish
an upper bound on Eve’s information given col-
lective attacks [24–26].
A. The noiseless covariance matrix, Γ
The covariance matrix Γ can be formulated
using the measurement operators TˆA (TˆB) and
DˆA (DˆB) corresponding to measurements by
Alice (Bob) in the arrival time and dispersed
arrival time bases, respectively. We first de-
fine these operators using several simplifying as-
sumptions [27]:
• Alice and Bob’s photons in |ΨAB〉 have a
negligible zero-momentum component.
• Each photon in this state propagates in a
single direction directly preceding detec-
tion.
• The timing resolution of Alice’s and Bob’s
detectors is insufficient to observe the ef-
fect of photon energy delocalization from
the photon position distribution [28].
We can then approximate the arrival time op-
erators as
Tˆj =
∫
tj |tj〉 〈tj | dtj , (4)
where j ∈ {A,B}. The dispersed arrival-time
measurement operator Dˆj is related to Tˆj by a
similarity transformation according to the dis-
persion operator Uˆ and a normalization giving
units of frequency:
Dˆj =
1
β2jL
Uˆ†j TˆjUˆj (5)
Uˆ =
1√
pi|k|
∫ ∫
e−i(t1−t2)
2/k |t1〉 〈t2| dt2dt1,
where k = 2β2L. Note that [Tˆj , Dˆj ] = i. Γ is
a four-by-four matrix composed of four two-by-
two submatrices denoted by
Γ =
(
γAA γAB
γBA γBB
)
, (6)
4where, for example, the submatrix γAB de-
scribes the covariance between the measure-
ments of Alice and Bob and is given by [26]
γAB =
1
2
( 〈{TˆA, TˆB}〉 〈{TˆA, DˆB}〉
〈{DˆA, TˆB}〉 〈{DˆA, DˆB}〉
)
, (7)
assuming the detection times in the arrival time
and dispersed arrival time bases are centered
around time zero. The noiseless covariance ma-
trix — i.e., the covariance matrix calculated in
the absence of Eve’s intrusion, channel effects
and Alice’s and Bob’s setup imperfections — is
therefore given by
γAA =
( u+v
16 −u+v8k
−u+v8k (u+v)(4k
2+uv)
4k2uv
)
γAB = γ
T
BA =
( u−v
16
u−v
8k
−u−v8k − (u−v)(4k
2+uv)
4k2uv
)
γBB =
( u+v
16
u+v
8k
u+v
8k
(u+v)(4k2+uv)
4k2uv
)
,
where u = 16σ2coh and v = 4σ
2
cor. In the limit of
large dispersion where k →∞,
Γ ≈

u+v
16 0
u−v
16 0
0 u+vuv 0 −u−vuv
u−v
16 0
u+v
16 0
0 −u−vuv 0 (u+v)uv
 (8)
which is equivalent to the covariance matrix cal-
culated from arrival time and spectral measure-
ment operators.
In the absence of noise, Alice and Bob per-
form photon arrival-time measurements with
outcomes described by Gaussian-distributed
random variables TA and TB , respectively. The
dispersed arrival-time elements, as they appear
in the covariance matrix, have been multiplied
by 1/β22L
2 due to the normalization in Eq. 5.
Before adding any timing noise due to Eve or
the transmission channel, we first multiply these
elements by β22L
2 to convert the normalized
variances with units of frequency back to tem-
poral variances. Therefore, from this point on,
we will assume that the Gaussian-distributed
random variables DA and DB are given in units
of time.
B. Covariance matrix Γ′ used to calculate
χ(A;E)
We consider the effect of an eavesdropper and
channel noise, which result in excess noise  and
a decrease in correlations η. Alice and Bob
know how much noise is added to their measure-
ments by dark counts and jitter and assume that
Eve cannot control these sources of noise. Sup-
pose that the temporal measurements by Alice
and Bob, in the presence of Eve yield values
T ′A, T
′
B , D
′
A, and D
′
B . The variances of these
primed values are related to the unprimed val-
ues (no Eve) according to
COV[T ′A, T
′
B ] = (1− η)COV[TA, TB ] (9)
Var[T ′A] = Var[TA] (10)
Var[T ′B ] = (1 + ) Var[TB ]. (11)
The primed dispersed arrival time variables are
related to the unprimed variables in an analo-
gous way. Excess noise appears only in in Bob’s
measurements because Alice’s photons do not
leave her setup (cf. Fig. 1(a)).
C. Covariance matrix Γ′′ used to calculate
I(A;B)
While imperfections in Alice’s and Bob’s se-
tups do not contribute to χ(A;E), they do lower
I(A;B). If we also include detector timing jitter
and dark counts, Alice’s and Bob’s arrival-time
measurements are described by
T ′′A =
{
T ′A +N
J
A, with probability RνA
NdTA , with probability RdA
(12)
T ′′B =
{
T ′B +N
J
B , with probability RνB
NdTB , with probability RdB
(13)
where NJA/B is the noise due to detector jit-
ter, NdTA/B is the noise due to dark counts when
measuring the temporal variance, and RνA/B
5(RdA/B) is the probability of registering a pho-
ton (dark count) given a single click on Al-
ice’s/Bob’s detector.
We calculate Rν and Rd as follows, ignor-
ing for now the possibility of generating more
than one photon pair per frame. The proba-
bility that Alice/Bob detects a photon and not
a dark count pA/B is the probability that Al-
ice’s source generates a photon pair, a photon
from the pair arrives at Alice’s/Bob’s detector,
is detected, and a dark count is not registered.
Therefore
pA/B = pν(1− LA/B)(1− pd). (14)
where LA (LB) is the loss in Alice’s (Bob’s) de-
tection system (including the channel for Bob),
pd is the probability that Alice or Bob’s detec-
tor registers a dark count in a frame, and pν is
the probability of generating a pair in a given
frame. The probability of either party register-
ing a dark count given one detection event in a
frame is
dA/B =
[
pνLA/B + (1− pν)
]
pd. (15)
From these results, we have
RνA/B =
pA/B
pA/B + dA/B
(16)
RdA/B =
dA/B
pA/B + dA/B
. (17)
From Eq. 9-13, it follows that
COV[T ′′A, T
′′
B ] = COV[RνAT
′
A, RνBT
′
B ] (18)
= RνARνB(1− η)COV[TA, TB ]
Var[T ′′A] = RνA(Var[TA] + Var[N
J
A])
+RdAVar[N
dT
A ] (19)
Var[T ′′B ] = RνB(Var[TB ] + Var[N
J
B ])
+RdBVar[N
dT
B ]. (20)
Alice’s and Bob’s dispersed arrival-time vari-
ables obey corresponding relations. The vari-
ance of NJA/B is σ
2
J . Since dark counts are uni-
formly distributed, if Alice and Bob measure
the variance in the arrival-time and dispersed
arrival-time bases to three standard deviations
of T ′A/B and D
′
A/B , the variances of N
dT
A/B and
NdDA/B are
Var[NdDA/B ] =
1
E
∫ E/2
−E/2
x2dx =
1
12
E2, (21)
Var[NdTA/B ] =
1
F
∫ F/2
−F/2
x2dx =
1
12
F 2, (22)
where E ≡ 6√Var[D′A] and F ≡ 6√Var[T ′A].
These covariances can then be used to calculate
the secret key capacity, as detailed in Appendix
A.
D. Noise parameters
While it is convenient to use  and η to de-
scribe Eve’s effect on the covariance matrix, it
is easier experimentally to measure a different
set of parameters. In particular, we consider ξ
and θ defined as
Var[T ′A − T ′B ] = (1 + ξ)Var[TA − TB ], (23)
and
Var[T ′A + T
′
B ] = (1− θ)Var[TA + TB ]. (24)
Both {ξ, θ} and {, η} can be used equivalently
to bound Eve’s information. These sets are re-
lated by
 =
−2η(d2 − 14 ) + ξ
d2 + 14
. (25)
Therefore, if Alice and Bob measure only ξ and
consider all physical  and η according to Eq.
25, they can find a minimum secret-key capac-
ity ∆I. This procedure is practical if, for a
given ξ, ∆I has only a weak dependence on η
and . To illustrate why this is useful, consider
 = η = 6.3 · 10−5, d = 64, ξ = 0.78, and
σcor = 30 ps. ξ corresponds to a change in the
correlation time, σ∆ = σcor(
√
1 + ξ − 1) = 10
ps.  corresponds to an increase in the variance
6of Bob’s measurements by < 0.1 ps, which is
more difficult to detect.
The range of physical values for  and η are
given by a number of constraints: (i) Eve can-
not increase the mutual information of Alice
and Bob by interacting with only Bob’s photons
due to the data processing inequality; (ii) The
symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
(see Appendix A) are greater than 12 ; (iii) Eve
can only degrade Alice and Bob’s measured time
correlation, i.e., Var[T ′A − T ′B ] ≥ Var[TA − TB ].
Under these constraints, we can then calculate
an upper bound on Eve’s information.
To relate noise measures for different d, we
use σ∆ in the following calculations.
IV. KEY RATES
While we have considered photons generated
by SPDC, it may not be possible to experi-
mentally determine the covariance matrix ele-
ments for such a state. In Eq. 1, we assume
that the biphoton amplitude is centered at times
〈tA〉 = 〈tB〉 = 0. However, since the pairs are
generated at random times under continuous-
wave excitation, Alice and Bob do not know the
center time of the biphoton envelope. There-
fore, Alice and Bob could use a prepare-and-
measure scheme, shown in Fig. 1(b), in which
Alice directly measures the arrival time of her
photon, sends this time to Bob as a synchroniza-
tion pulse, and then modulates the center time
of the distribution that she sends to Bob using
a Gaussian-distributed random number genera-
tor.
In addition to enabling measurement of the
covariance matrix, this technique allows Alice
to increase the photon generation rate. Assum-
ing Alice has high system detection efficiency,
she can determine if multiple pairs are emitted
in each frame and remove them with an am-
plitude modulator. This heralding and post-
selection scheme allows Alice to send nearly
one photon per frame with a low probability of
sending multiple photons. We find that the
multi-pair probability can then be bounded be-
low 0.01, even when the expected pair gener-
ation rate per frame, µf ≈ 1 (see derivation
in Appendix B). This ability for efficient post-
selection points to an important advantage of
using high-dimensional encoding: for high d, the
purity of the single photon source after post-
selection increases for a given pump power. We
will use this post-selection scheme now to ana-
lyze the DO-QKD protocol when it uses on the
order of one photon per frame.
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FIG. 2: (left) Secret-key capacity as a function of
channel length, assuming equal photon pair gener-
ation rate γν = pν/6σcoh and σcoh = 64 · 30 ps
for all d; propagation loss α = 0.2 dB/km; detec-
tor timing jitter σJ = 20 ps; Alice and Bob sys-
tem detection efficiencies 93%; σ∆ = 10 ps; dark
count rate, rD = 1000 s
−1; β = 0.9; expected num-
ber of pairs per frame assuming heralding, pν =
{0.607, 0.411, 0.231, 0.119} for d = {64, 32, 16, 8},
respectively (see Appendix B). (right) The secret-
key capacity given the same parameters, but with
γν = pν/(6d ·σcor) and σcor = 30 ps for all d. Upper
plots show bps. Lower plots show bpc, i.e., bits per
frame in which Alice and Bob measure in the same
basis and register only one detection event.
The secret-key rate, R∆I , with units of secure
bits per second (bps) is given by R∆I = ∆I ·PC ·
γν , where γν = pν/6σcoh, PC is the probability
that both Alice and Bob register one click in a
given frame, and ∆I is the secret-key capacity
from Eq. 3. The factor of 6 serves to separate
the center time of photons in neighboring frames
by more than 6 standard deviations.
Even for collective attacks, Alice and Bob can
share a large amount of information per sec-
7ond using the DO-QKD protocol. Pair genera-
tion rates in excess of 109 s−1 are possible us-
ing moderate pump powers [13], enabling secure
communication rates > 100 Mb/s. In Fig. 2, we
plot ∆I and R∆I as a function of fiber channel
length. With σ∆ = 10 ps, over ∼ 200 km trans-
mission length can be achieved.
Fig. 3 plots the dependence of ∆I on σ∆ for
different d, assuming the parameters given in
the Fig. 2 caption. Even if Alice and Bob mea-
sure σ∆ to be on the order of tens of picoseconds
for σcor = 30 ps, they can extract a positive ∆I.
Since we assume detector timing jitter of 20 ps,
σ∆ of this order is not difficult to measure.
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FIG. 3: ∆I as a function of offset parameter σ∆
assuming the parameters given in the caption of Fig.
2. (left) Photon pair generation rate γν = pν/6σcoh
and σcoh = 64 · 30 ps for all d. (right) γν = pν/(6d ·
σcor) and σcor = 30 ps for all d.
V. DISCUSSION
We have so far considered a passive selection
of basis measurements by Bob, using a beam-
splitter followed by two single-photon detectors,
as shown in Fig. 1(a). This number of detec-
tors could be reduced to only one if the beam
splitter were replaced by an active switch, as
shown in Fig. 1(b) Additional detectors would
be required to register instances in which mul-
tiple photons arrived at the detector within its
reset time. In particular, detecting instances in
which m photon pairs are generated requires at
least m detectors. But this probability, which
is given by the g-fold degenerate Bose-Einstein
distribution (see Appendix B), rapidly dimin-
ishes with m. Thus, even for µ ∼ 1, only a few
extra detectors would be required. The DO-
QKD protocol can therefore be very resource
efficient, whereas other protocols that employ
high-dimensional states in frequency [9, 10] or
OAM modes [11, 12] require a number of detec-
tors that grows linearly with the dimensionality
d.
It is interesting to consider why the DO-QKD
protocol can reach a much longer transmis-
sion length than continuous variable QKD (CV-
QKD) protocols, which are so far limited to 80
km [29]. We believe that a primary reason for
the shorter transmission length in CV-QKD is
that  and η increase with photon loss/channel
length. By contrast, in DO-QKD,  and η are
constant with photon loss/channel length (we
believe that this would be the case for any sin-
gle photon QKD protocol employing continuous
variables). Ultimately, the transmission length
in DO-QKD is limited not by an increase in the
Holevo information between Alice and Eve, but
rather by a decrease in the mutual information
between Alice and Bob; ∆I decreases to zero
with increasing channel length as the probabil-
ity of registering a dark count approaches the
probability of Bob detecting a photon from Al-
ice.
Transmission > 200 km is realistic because
the DO-QKD protocol is ideally suited for fiber
telecommunications networks and photonic in-
tegrated circuits (PIC), which are designed for
high-bandwidth temporal encoding. In Ref.
[30], a protocol was proposed using PICs for the
efficient generation of single photons on-demand
[31], and PICs can be used to implement disper-
sive elements, as noted in Sec. II.
To further reduce the complexity of Alice’s
setup, she could use an attenuated classical
source instead of an entangled photon source.
As in pulse position modulation (PPM), Alice
would simply modulate the optical field to gen-
erate random code-words. Two switches could
then be used for randomly transforming the
PPM signals into one of the temporal bases be-
fore sending them onward to Bob (note that
the loss introduced by these switches can be
compensated by increasing the light intensity).
Note that Alice no longer requires a photon de-
tector in this implementation: she only needs
8a modulated light source and dispersive optics.
This attenuated-light implementation could be
paired with a decoy state protocol [32] to pro-
tect against photon number splitting attacks.
For channel bandwidths of ∼ 1/σcor, DO-
QKD can operate at the Heisenberg measure-
ment limit, while for larger bandwidths, dense
wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM)
could allow operation on hundreds of indepen-
dent wavelength channels.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a scheme to perform
high-dimensional QKD to maximize the key
generation rate given experimental limitations
such as detector reset time or finite brightness
of entangled photon sources. Because the proto-
col relies on temporal correlations, it is ideally
suited for fiber communication systems. It is
also resource efficient and can be implemented
with as few as two detectors using entangled
photon pairs. If Alice used PPM and dispersion,
only Bob would require a single photon detec-
tor. The DO-QKD protocol allows the genera-
tion of > 4 bpc with communication rates ex-
ceeding 100 Mb/s and communication distances
over 200 km. We show that this protocol is se-
cure against collective attacks. Moreover, sin-
gle photon heralding with high dimensionality
d can be used to increase the communication
rate. Future work will focus on increasing the
rate at which Alice and Bob can perform the
necessary post-processing for secure communi-
cation, as this remains a rate-limiting step for
single-photon QKD protocols.
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Appendix A: Symplectic decomposition of
the covariance matrix
The quantum state described in Eq. 1 is
the post-selected, low-flux limit of the Gaus-
sian state generated by spontaneous parametric
down-conversion, and can be fully characterized
by Γ′. Here, we consider the collective attack, in
which Eve performs only individual interactions
with the photons flowing to Bob, but makes a
collective measurement on the joint state she
derives from all such interactions.
The Holevo information under this attack can
be found by [33]
χ(A;E) = S(ρE)− 1
2
(HT +HΩ) (A1)
HT =
∫
p(tA = t)S(ρE|tA=t)dt (A2)
HΩ =
∫
p(ωA = ω)S(ρE|ωA=ω)dω(A3)
where S(ρ) is the von Neumann entropy of the
quantum state ρ, p(tA = t) is the probability
density for Alice to measure tA in the arrival-
time basis, and p(ωA = ω) is the probability
density for Alice to measure ωA in the dispersed
arrival-time basis. Since Alice, Bob, and Eve’s
overall quantum state ρABE is a pure state,
S(ρE) = S(ρAB). After Alice’s measurement,
the quantum state shared by Bob and Eve is
pure. Therefore, S(ρE|tA=t) = S(ρB|tA=t) and
S(ρE|ωA=ω) = S(ρB|ωA=ω). Furthermore, given
the fact that all states are Gaussian, Bob and
Eve’s conditional quantum state is independent
of Alice’s measurement result. Thus, we can
drop the integrals in Eqs. A2 and A3 since the
integrand is a constant. Then Eq. A1 becomes
χ(A;E) = S(ρAB)− 1
2
[
S(ρB|t) + S(ρB|ω)
]
.
(A4)
After Eve’s interaction, Alice and Bob’s covari-
ance matrix becomes
Γ′ =
[
γAA (1− η)γAB
(1− η)γBA (1 + ε)γBB
]
. (A5)
γAA remains unchanged because Eve does not
9have access to Alice’s photon. We define
I1 = det[γAA] + det[(1 + )γBB ] + 2 det[(1− η)γAB ]
I2 = det[Γ
′] (A6)
d± =
1√
2
√
I1 ±
√
I21 − 4I2.
S(ρAB) is evaluated by S(ρAB) = f(d+) +
f(d−), where
f(x) = (x+
1
2
) log2(x+
1
2
)−(x− 1
2
) log2(x−
1
2
).
(A7)
To calculate the conditional terms in Eq. A4,
we first need to derive Bob’s conditional covari-
ance matrices γB|t and γB|ω, which are given by
γB|t = γBB − γBA (XtγAAXt)−1 γAB (A8a)
γB|ω = γBB − γBA (XωγAAXω)−1 γAB ,
(A8b)
where Xt =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, Xω =
[
0 0
0 1
]
, and the
matrix inverse is carried out by the Moore-
Penrose pseudoinverse. The entropy of the con-
ditional states reads
S(ρB|t) = f(
√
det[γB|t]) (A9a)
S(ρB|ω) = f(
√
det[γB|ω]). (A9b)
We next calculate the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob. The classical mutual in-
formation I(A;B) can be evaluated from Γ′′ by
I(A;B) =
1
4
[
log2
(
1
1− µ2T
)
+ log2
(
1
1− µ2D
)]
,
(A10)
where µT and µD are the correlation coefficients
for Alice and Bob’s arrival-time and dispersed
arrival-time measurements, given by
µT =
COV[T ′′A, T
′′
B ]√
Var[T ′′A]Var[T
′′
B ]
(A11)
µD =
COV[D′′A, D
′′
B ]√
Var[D′′A]Var[D
′′
B ]
for T ′′A and T
′′
B defined in the text.
Appendix B: Optimizing the photon source
and detectors
The security analysis in the text assumed that
at most a single pair was generated by Alice
in each frame. However, for an SPDC source,
the probability of generating m pairs over some
time interval is given by g-fold degenerate Bose-
Einstein statistics as [34]
p(µ,m, g) =
(µ/g)m/(g − 1)
[1 + (µ/g)m+g]B(m+ 1, g − 1)
(B1)
where µ is the expected number of pairs gener-
ated during that interval, g is the mode degen-
eracy and B(x, y) is the Beta function. We take
g = d in our calculations. Thus to suppress the
multi-pair emission probability, one must sup-
press µ, reducing the probability of generating
any photons at all. One can avoid this by em-
ploying a heralding scheme [35], whereby the de-
tection of Alice’s photon heralds the existence
of Bob’s, and Alice blocks the channel such that
no more than one signal photon leaves her setup
per frame. Alice then randomizes the center
time of the photon distribution sent to Bob ac-
cording to a Gaussian distribution to generate
the Gaussian measurement statistics assumed in
our analysis.
The relevant period over which to consider
multi-photon events is the time bin instead of
the protocol time frame, which can allow Alice
to increase the pair generation rate while sup-
pressing multi-pair generation.
The experimental setup is depicted in Fig. 4.
Alice prepares |ΨAB〉 and sends her photons di-
rectly to a single photon detector. Detection at
this stage heralds the presence of Bob’s photons.
If she detects more than one photon per frame,
she chooses one photon at random to pass to
Bob and modulates the SPDC output channel
with a modulator (Mod) to remove all other
photons. We assume 93% detection efficiency
[36] and 1 dB attenuation in the switch. The
detection can occur at the required rate > 100
MHz assuming the use of detector arrays [37].
Since the dark count rate is roughly six orders of
magnitude lower than the pair generation rate,
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FIG. 4: A prepare-and-measure scheme in which
Alice additionally modulates the output channel ac-
cording to the heralding scheme outlined in the text
using the element, Mod. Arrival time measurements
from her idler photon are fed forward to Mod en-
abling Alice to suppress multiphoton emission dur-
ing each frame.
we can safely neglect them in these calculations.
The protocol can only succeed if Alice regis-
ters a heralding event. She does so with proba-
bility 1− pfail, where
pfail =
∞∑
k=0
p(µf , k, d) ·D0(k). (B2)
Here,
D0(k) = (1− ηd)k, (B3)
where ηd is the single photon detector efficiency,
is the probability that 0 out of k photons are
detected.
From this, the probability of generating m
photons on the output is
pH(m) = (1− pfail)
∞∑
k=m
p(µb, k, d)D(k)
+ pfailδm,0
(B4)
where µb is the expected number of pairs gener-
ated in each time bin and δx,y is the Kronecker
delta function.
In Eq. B4,
D(k) =
(
k
m
)
ηms (1− ηs)k−m, (B5)
where ηs is the transmissivity of the modulator
in the ‘on’ position, is the probability that m
0
0.25
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0.75
1
µ
p
(1
)
 
 
0.02 0.2 2
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g−BE
FIG. 5: (upper) The probability of Alice sending
one photon per frame to Bob, p(1), as a function
of µf using the heralding circuit with the d shown
and for unheralded g-fold degenerate Bose-Einstein
statistics, “g-BE.” (lower) The probability of Alice
sending more than one photon per frame given that
one or more photons were sent for the heralded and
thermal statistics as above. We limit this proba-
bility to be less than 0.01, which places an upper
bound on µf .
of the k generated photons make it through the
switching element.
We plot the results of this analysis in Fig.
5. As d increases for a given µf , the average
pair generation rate per time bin decreases re-
sulting in a suppression of multiphoton emis-
sion during the frame. By limiting the proba-
bility of emitting multiple photons per frame
given one or more photons were emitted, we
determine the probability for generating one
photon, p(1) ≈ pν . For d = {64, 32, 16, 8},
pν = {0.607, 0.411, 0.231, 0.119}, respectively.
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